The 'Wagering Calamity' objection to utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is risky
Wagering Calamity: Positive Utility
The objection can be introduced with the following thought experiment:
Option 1: A 99% chance of causing the death of everyone and a 1% chance of bringing about nine trillion maximally happy people.
Option 2: A guaranteed outcome of creating nine billion maximally happy people.
According to the principles of classic utilitarianism, the expected utility from Option 1 (0.01 x 9 trillion = 90 billion) exceeds that of Option 2. Yet, a glaring 99% chance of a disastrous outcome shadows this immense potential for happiness.1
Negative Utility
The Wagering Calamity Objection becomes even more intriguing when we frame it in terms of negative utility:
Option 1: A 99% chance that everyone on earth gets tortured for all of time (-100 utils per person) and a 1% chance that a septillion happy people get created (+100 utils pp) for all of time
Option 2: A 100% chance that everyone on earth becomes maximally happy for all of time (+100 utils pp)
Let's assume the population in both these scenario's remain stable over time (or grow similarly), Expected Value Theory (and classic utilitarianism by extension) says we should choose option 1, even though this has a 99% chance of an s-risk, over a guaranteed everlasting utopia for everyone.
We can make it more pernicious by combining it with the repugnant conlusion to give option 1 a 1% chance of creating an enormous amount of people whose lives are barely worth living (+1 util pp), but are still in aggregate more utils.
Moral Intuitions and the Role of Risk
Classic utilitarian calculations seem to disregard our innate moral instincts that lean towards risk aversion. Given the scenarios presented, many would instinctively choose Option 2 or Option B, valuing the certainty of a positive outcome over an immensely rewarding but perilously risky alternative.
Even if we create scenarios with things like 50/50 odds or even favorable odds, I think most people would have a moral instict to not choose the option with the possible calamity.
The Wagering Calamity Objection compels us to think beyond mere arithmetic. It asks us to consider the moral weight of risk and the ethical implications of near-certain negative outcomes.
Afterword
This objection seems to be related to Pascals-mugging (and infinite ethics), but it isn’t the same thing. I tried looking for it online but couldn’t find it. I asked the ‘askphilosophy’ subreddit about it and they couldn’t find it either. Please let me know if this objection already exists.
Let’s assume in this and the next scenario the population remains fixed for the sake of simplicity