this is pretty interesting, and I enjoyed it. One question that you’re not answering, I think, is why you’re normalizing the ‘payoffs’ in each moral theory. Why do you assume that 1% in Utilitarianism has similar affects on your action than 1% Kantianism? This seems to be the big question.
I'm not doing that for sortition and runoff; there the theories can use whatever scale they like, or even no scale at all, because it doesn't really matter since it doesn't affect which theory gets selected.
With the convex randomization I once again require numbers, aka, interval-scale measurability (ratio-scale measurability?) so to prevent one theory from dominating I normalize it, like MEC does, which they defended with the "equal say" argument. (If you think that's ad hoc, ehhh, maybe?)
this is pretty interesting, and I enjoyed it. One question that you’re not answering, I think, is why you’re normalizing the ‘payoffs’ in each moral theory. Why do you assume that 1% in Utilitarianism has similar affects on your action than 1% Kantianism? This seems to be the big question.
I'm not doing that for sortition and runoff; there the theories can use whatever scale they like, or even no scale at all, because it doesn't really matter since it doesn't affect which theory gets selected.
With the convex randomization I once again require numbers, aka, interval-scale measurability (ratio-scale measurability?) so to prevent one theory from dominating I normalize it, like MEC does, which they defended with the "equal say" argument. (If you think that's ad hoc, ehhh, maybe?)